










The paper begins by introducing a heuristic distinction between the “dogmatist” and the “pragmatist” approaches to philosophy of history.  Dogmatists tend to use history to exemplify and shore up their pre-existing philosophical convictions.  Pragmatists, on the other hand, construe philosophy of history as a form of critical reflection on the actual historical practice, with epistemic criteria of proper practice emerging in the course of the research itself, not antecedently deduced from general philosophical considerations.  The core of the paper discusses the work of Paul Roth, which is treated both as a specimen of the pragmatist mode of argumentation, and as a philosophical vindication, in the context of history, of the central pragmatist contention that we cannot successfully define knowledge in terms of a relation to reality, where reality is somehow understood independently and in advance of us knowing it.  It is argued that Roth’s skillful deployment of arguments emerging from the recent philosophy of science to expose naïve realism in philosophy of history as a vestige of the no-longer-tenable philosophical vision opens a way for thinking productively about history as a complex and evolving form of research practice.


The first part of this paper aims to situate Paul Roth’s approach to philosophy of history vis-à-vis some more traditional theoretical alternatives, while the second explicates how his well-known critique of historical realism illustrates his broader meta-philosophical commitments. It makes sense to begin by introducing a pair of provisional heuristic distinctions, so as to use them later on to peg some of the important characteristics of Roth’s philosophical outlook.  The first distinction, between the dogmatist and the pragmatist approaches to philosophy of history, is a particularly important one for our purposes. Thus, dogmatist approaches concern themselves primarily with vindicating some fundamental elements of a pre-established a-priori philosophical vision: defending realism, rescuing rational agency, preserving free will, restoring the disciplinary autonomy of humanities, etc.  History, here, is meant to illustrate, support, or reinforce some theoretical insights secured in advance by philosophical thought.  Meanwhile, a pragmatist approach recommends seeing history primarily as a special and advanced mode of inquiry, which readily invites comparisons with other disciplined modes of pursuing understanding and knowledge, and generates important philosophical conundrums and puzzles of its own.
To illustrate, Michel Foucault once explained his disagreements with Habermas by referencing an important difference between the philosophical traditions to which they respectively belong. Habermas, according to Foucault, comes from a tradition built around a continuous history of reason – a tradition which suffers, in modernity, from a painful split between the instrumental/scientific and moral reason, while Foucault himself comes from a tradition of reflecting upon the developments in the history of science – a tradition where the aforementioned split does not arise (Foucault 1994, p. 118).  On terms proposed, Foucault emerges as a pragmatist in this comparison, to the degree that his attention is focused on historically circumscribed and locally contextualized attempts to cope and understand, without trying to anticipate the way in which the results of his investigations can fit in with a pre-established philosophical framework.  The contrast can further be elaborated by recalling Dewey’s description of modernity as a conflict between “the picture of the world painted by modern science” and “the earlier picture which gave classic metaphysics its intellectual foundation and confirmation” (Dewey 1920, p. 54).  Philosophy can either submit itself to an apprenticeship in the new modes and methods of inquiry or can, alternatively, insist on the perennial relevance of its own traditional preoccupations.  Intellectual inertia strongly favors the latter course because, in contrast to the “dry, thin and meager scientific standpoint” (ibid, 211), the old philosophical conceptions have already been thoroughly incorporated into the “emotionalized imagination” of individuals as well as the enabling ideology of social institutions (Dewey 2012, p. 170). Nonetheless, as a pragmatist, Dewey strongly recommends resisting this latter course.  Instead, he emphatically endorses the first option, wherein philosophical reflection commits to the task of adjusting itself to the realities of the first-order inquiry.
Our second distinction, between the speculative and the critical philosophy of history, is mainly worth mentioning here because in can work, inadvertently, at cross-purposes with our first distinction, resulting in a temptation to assign all speculative philosophy of history to the dogmatic side, and to equate the pragmatist philosophy of history with critical philosophy of history tout court.​[2]​  While critical philosophy of history programmatically abstains from speculative pronouncements about the meaning or trajectory of actual historical events and focuses exclusively on questions that pertain to the scholarly investigation and writing of history, it can, nonetheless, be still dogmatic, as illustrated by the protracted debates between the covering-law theorists and the defenders of rational agency explanations.  The covering-law theorists charged history with discovering projectable inductive generalizations, construing it inadvertently as a distinctively immature part of an (eventually) unified field of social science.  The champions of history’s disciplinary autonomy were putting a new spin on some century-old arguments, presenting history as a sui generis study of the dynamics of rational agency construed normatively in folk-psychological terms, indifferent to empirical findings and methods of the naturalistic social science.  Both moved squarely within the purview of the critical philosophy of history; and both showed a notorious lack of interest in the actual practice of historical investigation (Ankersmit 1986, p. 10).  The discussions of covering law theorists read “like a lecture on applied logic of science,” while those of the rational agency theorists looked “like a chapter in a book in the philosophy of action” (ibid, 11).  The debate revolved around abstract philosophical issues; history merely supplied the (largely imagined) new territory in which the contested philosophical issues could be played out.  In the end, as Goldstein points out, these contests were never concerned with whether, say, covering laws are actually employed or can be profitably employed by historians; the issue to be settled instead was the a priori matter of whether or not human action can be, in principle, covered by general laws, philosophically speaking (Goldstein 1976, p. 153), qualifying the whole debate as a dogmatist quarrel.  
Writing from within the analytic tradition, it is difficult, at this point, to reclaim a non-pejorative sense for the notion of speculative philosophy of history.  Still, it seems like a perfectly good name for some speculative philosophical proposals about significant structures of human encultured temporal experience which can be profitably discerned in or critically clarified by the study of history.  In the past, many such proposals had been offered in a dogmatic manner, as philosophical verities that history needs to live up to and that historians must, therefore, take as their guide to historical interpretation.  It need not be that way: when offered as potentially interesting suggestions or hypotheses to be held up against and tested by the actual historical practice such philosophical speculations can be construed in a pragmatist key, as exploratory theoretical moves of a tentative sort, offered in the hope of opening new paths for promising research.
The essential point is this: the distinction between the dogmatist and the pragmatist does not hinge on the question of whether one’s primary philosophical interest is in history or historiography.  What is essential is the pragmatist’s claim that we cannot make much sense of the very notion of historical reality independently of the accomplishments of our actual historical research practice; and that, therefore, we cannot possibly endeavor to assess the epistemic validity of our historical conclusions by appeal to something like an untheorized historical truth.  This, of course, is a purely philosophical commitment, held for reasons some of which will emerge in the discussion that follows.  A commitment of this sort necessarily consigns the philosophy of history to the role of theoretical reflection upon the extant historical practice and its results.  Hence, before moving on, it seems proper to offer some remarks on the limits of such reflection and its normative force.
The pragmatist perspective commits us to the epistemic primacy of historical inquiry, meaning that, at least in matters of a contentious sort,​[3]​ philosophical reflection remains essentially accountable to the processes and outcomes of historical practice.  Hence, in line with the general pragmatist emphasis on the consequences of a theory as opposed to its originary principles, a position in philosophy of history can be ultimately validated only by the developments within the historical practice itself.  This does not mean, of course, that philosophy of history is beholden to the current state of historical practice and can have no normative or critical force of its own.  As an enterprise critical of the present state of historical practice, it can always draw support, for example, from examining the past precedent, just as it is always entitled to take a risk and place its bets on the future.  More importantly, since no research practice is ever truly homogeneous, a philosopher of history can endeavor to distinguish between the promising and the retrograde aspects of the current practice, modeling her own normative proposals on the extension of the former and redaction of the latter.  A proposal in philosophy of history can muster a compelling case on various grounds, including purely philosophical ones; however, its real merit cannot be entirely vindicated by anything short of a prominent and lasting consensus that its posits adequately describe the best work that the actual professional historians have done thus far. 





Viewed in terms of the distinctions proposed above, Roth’s published work of recent decades can be seen, more or less, as a pioneering contribution to the pragmatist critical philosophy of history.  He describes his own brand of the analytic philosophy of history as “the runt of a litter of topics sprung from philosophy of science in its youth” (Roth 2016a).  In pragmatist terms, Roth’s overarching strategy is premised on the conviction that historical research shares some important features and problems with scientific research in general, and that, therefore, some of the prominent lessons from contemporary philosophy of science could be profitably adopted mutatis mutandis in confronting important theoretical conundrums in philosophy of history.  At the center of his efforts stands his trademark attack on uncritical historical realism which, on the level of a purely philosophical commitment, is aligned with the central pragmatist tenet that we cannot articulate an adequate notion of historical reality prior to or independent of our actual (preferably disciplined) attempts to know it.
However, Roth is not at all a philosophical champion of pragmatism:​[4]​ that, of course, would make him just another dogmatic philosopher.  Instead, he embarks upon his project, in a genuinely pragmatist fashion, by confronting a problem within the scope of reflective historiography: namely, the “existence of competing interpretations which appear unable to find a crucial test to rule out the rival view” (Roth 1995, p. 241).  It is this fact, rather than the philosophical analysis adduced to explain it, that constitutes, on Roth’s view, the ultimate challenge to historical realism.
At the same time, as a philosopher, Roth is willing to venture a theoretical explanation of this notable fact, which does away with its status as a puzzling anomaly by showing that our antecedent expectations to the contrary had been prompted by a faulty and outdated philosophical conception of historical investigation and its aims.  In the process of reconstructing his argument qua a specimen of a pragmatist approach to philosophy of history, we will pass through three consecutive stages. First, we need to say something about the origin of naïve historical realism, which tends to construe “reality” in terms of correspondence to something antecedently given, and which runs afoul of the interpretive historical pluralism which Roth takes for granted. Then, we will follow up with Roth’s critique of this conception on philosophical grounds, with a heavy reliance on the lessons learned from contemporary philosophy of science.  Simultaneously, these arguments can be seen as laying the groundwork for a more philosophically adequate conception of reality anchored in historical research practice. In conclusion, we discuss one example of what an realist constraint may look like within the terms of Roth’s reconstructed version of the relationship between historical reality and historical inquiry.
Roth claims that we need to reject "the picture of a past that is simply there waiting for an historian to come along" (Roth 1988, p. 5).  The reality of the past, according to this picture, is taken to be somehow constituted by the historical events themselves independently of all historical interest or inquiry.  So, the task of the historian essentially consist in matching her account to the unmediated meaning intrinsically possessed by the corresponding stretches of lived history that she is trying to describe.  However, Roth objects, there is simply no philosophically coherent way to speak of meaningful historical events independently of a "theoretical specification" of them (ibid, 8).  
The attitude of “simple” realism, informing much of what is said and written about history by laymen and professionals alike, is grounded simultaneously in a common-sense intuition and in a bad but ubiquitous philosophical theory.  The common-sense intuition, grounded in the ordinary ways of speaking and thinking (Roth 2016b; Roth 2012, pp. 317 -8), tends to assimilate the notion of historical knowledge to the mundane, uncritical conception of “statements about the past” (Goldstein 1976, p. xvii).  “Something” was really “there” (in the past), and so to tell the truth about the past must mean to name that something as it was.  An informal response to this view simply points to the fact that, although admittedly something was indeed going on in the past, this does not imply that something determinate was really there.  Sometimes we look out into the darkness and say – “there is nothing there at all.”  Sometimes we talk about a stretch of time, and say that “nothing happened.”  But something was surely going on all along.  Nothing of interest, however; nothing worth mentioning; something indeterminate; or something determinable perhaps, but of no real consequence.  To say that something was there, we need to individuate this “something” – and that means to isolate it (temporally, spatially, notionally, etc.) from the general flow of things that is generally going on, either locally or ecumenically.  Something is really always going on anyhow, but saying that something is really there requires a frame of reference.  On a more formal note, we can also observe that the common-sense intuition tends to model the idea of history on that of memory, wherein we recall past events by summoning the impressions they had left in our mind. From an historical point of view, such “remembered” narratives tend to possess a somewhat mythical quality (Goldstein 1996, p. 247) because memory, which is primarily responsive to the needs of subjectivity, tends to largely bypass the professional requirement of proof (Megill 2007, pp. 53-4).  
A common-sense realist, then, worries primarily whether, at present, we do indeed have a reasonably adequate access to the past.  A philosophical realist, on the other hand, need not concern himself with the problem of access at all.  Instead, he is concerned with defending a certain a priori criterion of what counts as historical knowledge in the first place.  He maintains that there is a certain way the past had been, independently of our theorizing and antecedently to our existence, and to know the past is to see or to describe it exactly as it once had been.  If an historian cannot secure that kind of knowledge, so much the worse for the historian.  A philosophical realist, then, may well turn out to be a historical skeptic.  Roth, on the other hand, is a philosophical skeptic but not a historical one.  Roth is a historical relativist.  Accordingly, he does not repudiate the ordinary idea that we can have historical knowledge; instead, what he rejects is the philosophical proposal that there can be some one correct way of describing the past.
However, his argument against the realist position goes deeper than the questions about historical skepticism or interpretive pluralism.  Instead, it sets out to undermine the very notion that our sense of historical reality must be anchored in some kind of antecedently existing content independent of historians’ practice.  Rather than being anchored in a content of any sort, our sense of the reality of the past is anchored precisely in our evolving historical practices, and whatever content history ends up possessing is invariably made up of the contents that our pursuit of these practices continues to eventually turn up.  This attack on the notion of a neutral pre-given historical content is broken down by Roth into two theoretical postulates: a “non-aggregativity” thesis and a “non-standardization” thesis.  The “non-aggregativity” thesis suggests that, when it comes to the study of historical past, we have good reasons to expect a plurality of appropriately warranted candidate accounts which nevertheless do not add up to a single coherent picture (Roth 2016a).  As such, it speaks against the philosophical realist’s expectation that our past can be grasped as a whole from the vantage point of some privileged, intrinsically warranted perspective. The non-standardization thesis, in turn, claims that, since historical events “only exist as events under description, and descriptions continuously emerge and change retrospectively,” histories effectively “create pasts by the way in which particular events come to be fashioned and accounted for” (Roth 2016a).  Hence, there can be no way to ground historical knowledge in something that pre-exists historical research; the only legitimate ground we have is the shifting ground of provisionally accepted and perpetually contested historical results.
The non-aggregativity thesis is meant to challenge the realist notion that there is some natural, rational, or otherwise intrinsically mandated theoretical framework for organizing our historical experience and making sense of it.  According to Roth, we have good reasons to believe that, generally speaking, “nature does not dictate any organizing scheme to us” (Roth 2012, p. 329), although some organizing schemes may fare better than some others, and some especially promising ways of thinking may turn out to stand or fall together (ibid, p. 339).  A stance of this sort is especially warranted with respect to experiences that arise in the social context, because the social world is always already an interpreted world, and the way that it functions depends crucially on the meaning that its participants attach to the various aspects of its functioning.  Hence, the very idea of a uniquely correct perspective with respect to things social implies a very strong form of meaning realism (Roth 2003, p. 312), of the kind that may well be impossible to vindicate on evidential grounds.  
Overt criteria of proper understanding cannot extend beyond apparent success in communication; there is no way to literally “get into somebody’s head.”  And even if there were, there is no good reason to believe that something appropriately definite would be discovered therein.  Roth, here, borrows a familiar Quinean point that language competence does not presuppose the possession of an articulate semantic theory (Roth 1978, p. 348). Hence, in all likelihood, there really isn’t anything inside the head that a uniquely correct interpretation would correspond to.  It is not at all clear that “a certain intuition people have concerning the determinacy of their own beliefs…has rational justification” (Roth 1987, p. 16).  Trained scientists are liable to produce disparate and even conflicting interpretations of the same social phenomena.  Is there any reason to expect that the untrained participants in social life must be somehow miraculously spared such intermittently baffling effects of interpretive ambiguity and perspectival pluralism (Roth 2003, p. 318)?  Sharing a social form of life does not imply sharing a fully defined conceptual scheme.  Meaning that is “shared” within a culture is at best a Weberian idealization, because ideas “live in many minds and institutions, in multiple and changing forms” (Weber 2011, p. 96).  Recognizing the indeterminacy of cultural meaning is a natural corollary of acknowledging that cultures are generally heterogeneous.  Untutored common sense promotes the venerable illusion that since we manage to use words in common we must share meanings and know what we mean.  Yet, on a moment’s reflection, the idea begins to appear plausible indeed that “the use of the undifferentiated collective concepts of everyday speech is always a cloak for confusion of thought and action” (ibid, 110).
The point, emphatically, is not to make a mystery out of meaning and communication.  It’s just that the appropriate results can be secured by more modest means than philosophical meaning-realism (Roth 2003, p. 318).  “Meaning,” says Roth, “can be ‘stabilized’ in different and conflicting ways” (ibid, p. 319).  Our educational, cultural, communicative practices render the search for the transcendental shared ground superfluous.  Meaning lives on in our social practices.  The downside of this elegant resolution is that meaning cannot be the tidy logical affair that philosophical common sense desires it to be.  It also means that, for the most part, confirming the adequacy of our interpretation of social phenomena requires access to “a living core of users,” whose practices confer meaning onto the phenomenon in question (Roth 2012, p. 329).  Our confidence in the correctness of our interpretations diminishes to the point of vanishing as we progressively lose continuity with the living practice.  We still can have our guesses, but no intrinsically privileged modes of access.  There is no proper argument to show that things which make sense to us, in terms of values, pertinent considerations, or good reasons must also necessarily make sense to a people with whom we have no living cultural bond (Roth 2008, p. 67). 
A score of reasons points to the conclusion that there can be no one right way to organize the past.  In describing the past, we are inadvertently engaged in equilibrating between the concepts that historical agents used to describe themselves and the later concepts which we cannot help using in describing their actions (Roth 2016b).  There is, of course, no general recipe as to how to perform this balancing act correctly in each instance.  Blind privileging of the perspective contemporaneous with the events, characteristic of naïve realism, fails without a caveat: understanding historical events requires us to put things into perspective in a way which is simply not available until after the events as well as their downstream repercussions have run their course.  In fact, “…there is a class of descriptions of any event under which the event cannot be witnessed…  The whole truth concerning an event can only be known after, and sometimes only long after the event itself has taken place” (Danto 1965, p. 151).  
This latter contention, in turn, connects very naturally to Roth’s non-standardization thesis, which declares that histories “create pasts by the way in which particular events come to be fashioned and accounted for” (Roth 2016a).  One reasonably familiar line of interpreting this statement develops the implications of a sensible observation that all history is “the reconstitution of developments in the linear form of history” (Foucault 2010, p. 137).​[5]​  Histories do not happen as written; the events do not unfold in the way in which they are retrospectively cognized.  History, as both Danto and Mink have notably argued at length, is to some degree a product of the “creative activity” of the historian’s “disciplined imagination” (Danto 1965, p. 121; Mink 1987, p. 202).  History, according to Danto, is “not at reproduction but at a kind of organization of the past” and, as such, it is intrinsically hospitable to warranted relativism (Danto 1965, p. 111).  To an extent, the non-standardization thesis can be rightly seen as a radicalization of Danto’s argument, intended to undercut the lingering impression that there is something like a pre-existing content in history waiting to be organized by an historian’s imagination.  Danto’s argument makes it clear that alternative historical emplotments contain alternative versions of events, with corresponding assignments of significance depending crucially on the way in which a given event becomes contextualized within the scope of a particular narrative.  However, his account is also liable to leave us with the impression that historical events somehow pre-exist interpretation, which may consequently transform these events through the differential weighting, selective emphasis, omission and contextualization.  Accordingly, one may still hope to reach a level of analysis that relates to the events simpliciter; an artless level at which things are recorded and not imagined.  Roth’s non-standardization thesis, then, enables us to dispense with these last vestiges of realist intuitions in history.  
Fascination with the narrative aspect of history often tends to draw the attention away from the question of how events in history are originally constituted on the basis of available evidence.  Instead, the interpretation or emplotment of events becomes the focus of contention, while the events themselves are treated as somehow antecedently known (Goldstein 1976, p. xxv).  And so they are, but only as a result of prior historical research which concerns itself with the question of what constitutes the relevant evidence in a given case, and what kind of conjectures with respect to the pertinent events can be formed on the basis of this evidence.  At this level, the historian’s engagement with his materials bears a close resemblance to the work usually done in natural sciences (Goldstein 1976, p. 142), with especial attention paid to the methodology, the admissible forms of evidence, and the results produced by a score of auxiliary specialized disciplines (e.g. archeology, philology, or numismatics).  However, even this meticulous work is best thought of as an attempt to imagine some provisionally organized portions of the past in accordance with the pertinent strictures of the disciplinary methodology; at no point do the past events step forth to speak for themselves.  Hence, historians at this stage of inquiry often find themselves disagreeing about which evidence is “germane to the problem” (Goldstein 1996, p. 181), with contending parties routinely suggesting that the relevant evidence “calls for the constitution of different historical facts” (Goldstein 1976, p. 84).   




Doing away with the realist intuitions is liable to give rise to concerns about a potential descent into arbitrariness.  Roth’s opponents, giving vent to such anxieties, say that his position “seems to annul everything but the artifice of writing and transient solidarity with some others in some convictions" (Zammito 2008, p. 248).  This is either a complete misunderstanding or an intentional caricature.  Roth does claim that, at least in history, there can be no such thing as a “determinate past” (1992, p. 21).  He does emphasize his conviction that acceptable interpretations of the past need not aggregate in any straightforward manner, may in fact be mutually incompatible, cannot be enumerated in advance, and can employ, retrospectively, meaning assignments and configurations that would not have been familiar or intelligible to the actual participants in the transactions at issue.  As new ways of collating human behaviors emerge, new types of actions enter into our descriptions of the past (Roth 2012, p. 333).  As we invent new descriptive and analytic vocabularies, we also re-invent the historical past.  Yet, Roth has no intention of endorsing the view that the candidate historical interpretations are spuriously fashioned, or that we have no criteria besides idiosyncratic preference for choosing some interpretations over others.  He openly opposes the “aesthetic historicism” that champions the notion of basing our choice between competing accounts on purely moral, aesthetic, or other extra-cognitive considerations (Roth 1992, p. 23).  In fact, an interest in reviving the central epistemic concerns pertaining to the logic of historical explanation, reconfigured in the light of the lessons learned from the narrativist turn, lies at the center of his work (Roth 2016, p. 281).
Much of what Roth says about history emerges from a sustained reflection on the differences and similarities between the study of history and other scientific enterprises.  For example, he thinks that the notion of explanation in history must be divorced from that of prediction (Roth 2016b), because of the essentially retrospective nature of historical explanations.  Secondly, the “canonical” conception of verification must be abandoned or revised to fit the realities of historical research (Roth 2012, p. 315).  One complication, on this score, arises from the ostensible impossibility of standardizing the types of occurrences that historians take as their data.  History cannot afford to be nearly as opportunistic as theoretical natural science in this regard.  A natural scientist is entitled to seek understanding wherever she can find it, paying attention primarily to relationships that promise a repayment in terms of law-like regularities or, say, reliably replicable experimental results.  An historian, on the other hand, is (seemingly) obliged to discuss and explain events of human interest, regardless of their promise to yield clean theoretical generalizations (Roth 2016a).  Hence, the prospects of having anything like a standard observational protocol in history remain somewhat dim.  Another complication is due to the fact that, contrary to popular opinion, historians do not derive their conclusions from observable evidence through any kind of inductive procedure (Goldstein 1976, p. 125).  Instead, they resort to the hypothetical (or abductive) reasoning to tentatively postulate some plausible construals of events which render otherwise unaccountable evidence intelligible as a part of some larger theoretical whole (ibid, p. 127; Goldstein 1996, p. 128; Roth 2012, p. 322).  Hence, the constituent data of the final historical (frequently narrative) explanation are often already a product of an elaborate theoretically freighted construction.  
Roth’s work in the philosophy of history thus far has largely been concerned with defending and developing these crucial points.  Looming on the horizon is a more general challenge of “articulating a pluralism that retains critical or normative bite” (Roth 1992, p. 27), of combining a sense of proper constraints with a healthy taste for exploratory experimentation.  Abandoning arbitrary dogmatic strictures cannot result in an “anything goes” approach (Roth 1987, p. 112).  Fruitful research cannot subsist without heuristic guidelines and methodological considerations.  Opposition to philosophical dogmatism does not aim at an arbitrary loosening of constraints.  It is powered, instead, by the historically sanctioned recognition that pertinent norms guiding scientific research generally emerge and develop in the course of conducting research (Roth 2008, p. 58) – not prior to or apart from it.  In the spirit of Laudan’s epistemic naturalism (Laudan 1996, p. 155), one could say that the norms and methods of inquiry are generally best viewed as theories about the way in which acquisition of knowledge can best proceed in a given domain (ibid, p. 171).  As such, they are subject to the eventual modification, rejection, or partial retention depending on the results that they yield.  Philosophers of history, then, are entitled to offer their reflections on history and historical practice; they are entitled even to make tentative proposals about the course that some branches of historical inquiry may pursue; they are also entitled to offer sophisticated criticisms of the presuppositions and norms currently prevalent within the historical profession.  What they are not entitled to do, however, is to substitute abstract philosophical reasoning about norms for the norms that actually prove their worth in historical research.
Furthermore, it is worth noting that abandoning questionable philosophical realist intuitions does not entail giving up on the problem of proper realistic constraints on historical representation.  All that is required of us is to stop thinking about historical realism in traditional correspondence terms.​[6]​  In fact, as the following example is intended to demonstrate, we need not face any special difficulty when discussing appropriate realist constraints without invoking the notions of copying, recording, resemblance, or correspondence.  The analogy with Goodman’s discussion of pictorial representation can potentially help us see how a comparable line of reasoning may be advanced with respect to the problem of realism in historical representation.   
Goodman’s argument against representational realism in painting was meant to challenge the conventional relationship between representation and resemblance (Goodman 1968, p. 5).  A good representation, so he argued, is always distilled “from a variety of experiences” with the subject (ibid, p. 20), and can only present its subject under some partial aspect.  Some aspects are decidedly peripheral (Goodman’s example is “Duke of Wellington as he looks to a drunk through a raindrop”), some are central; but there is no such thing as an aspect-free representation (ibid, p. 7).  The bottom line is that a successful representation consists in aptly “characterizing” one’s subject, instead of “copying” or merely “passive reporting” on it (ibid, p. 31).  An interesting and apt characterization, in turn, succeeds through an act of invention (ibid, p. 33), which brings something essential yet previously unnoticed to the fore.  It is a question of insight, not mere accuracy and diligence.  That is why, to the extent that “realignments” directly or indirectly produced by a new perspective are “interesting and important,” the “picture … makes a genuine contribution to knowledge” (ibid, p. 33).  
The key lesson to be taken away from this discussion is the idea that the production of an adequate construal or representation is not a mechanical performance, assessed by a simple comparison to the original.  Instead it is something we “achieve” (ibid, 9), and the resulting effect of spontaneous recognition issues forth (in the first instance) as a surprising accomplishment.  Goodman himself did not seem to believe that there are any essential features shared by all successful realist representations; to some extent, he was inclined to think of realism as more or less a matter of convention.  For this, he has been criticized repeatedly; but only one of his critics rose to the challenge of proposing a positive constraint, which has been since acknowledged by many as a plausible criterion of realism in pictorial representation.  
The author of the argument, Flint Schier pointed out a peculiar feature of pictorial systems: namely, once we have learned to interpret a small number of samples of a particular style, we can interpret an indefinite number of depictions executed under the specified convention, as long as we are familiar (more or less) with the real-world counterparts of the items depicted (Schier 1986, p. 43).  Shier called this a “natural generativity” condition and, importantly, he pointed out that natural generativity is not reducible to resemblance (ibid, p. 181).  Instead it relies on the fundamental capacity of some pictorials symbols to trigger the same recognitional processes as the objects they are meant to depict (ibid, p. 187).  Achieving a visual resemblance between the pictorial symbol and its object turns out to be only one of the ways to accomplish this effect.  Accordingly, the effect of realism itself becomes a kind of accomplishment, and the story that Schier tells provides us with an interesting strategy for construing the sense of this accomplishment in theoretical terms.  
Communication in natural language presupposes a shared vocabulary, a shared means of expressing ideas.  A realist visual technique, on the other hand permits an artist to convey to the viewer a sense of recognition and understanding, despite the latter’s almost complete lack of mastery of the communicative medium involved (ibid, p. 158).  (Few casual viewers understand the way in which a pictorial image is actually built up.)  Yet, there is no a-priori recipe for how to produce an accomplishment of this sort.  Specific techniques are discovered by artists of talent; new artists experiment with the older techniques in hopes of achieving a recognized realism of their own.  It is often impossible, moreover, to settle the issue of realism between competing conventions, precisely because each “technique or medium can only claim to reflect a corner of reality” (ibid, p. 147).  For example, it is impossible to paint a picture which simultaneously preserves local color and renders adequately the tonal gradations suggesting distance and space (ibid, p. 146). 
Here, then, we have an example of what may count as a good “realist” constraint within a generally irrealist account of representation.  There are some good reasons to think that an analogous account of realism as a distinctive type of representational accomplishment can be offered with respect to historical realism; or at least there are no obvious reasons to believe the contrary.  We may argue about the extent of permissible analogy between pictorial and historical representation, but that is not the issue.  The discussion of pictorial realism, here, was merely intended to show, by means of an example, that discussing realism does not call for a necessary reliance on the notions of resemblance and correspondence, that there are ways of talking about realism that are more comprehensive, more accurate, and more philosophically persuasive.    
If realistic representation is understood in terms of compelling inventions which secure a proper effect, what are the criteria of legitimacy for the inventions of this sort, aside from the “reality effect” that they manage, apparently, to produce?  Goodman’s criterion of an appropriate invention was the test of “projection” (Goodman 1968, p. 201): would this particular novel way of putting things together work under different circumstances and with different samples?  It is one thing to establish an initial claim to plausibility: for that purpose, a new mode of rendering merely needs to be exemplified in a convincing and engaging fashion (Goodman 1978, p. 106).  For example, a new mode of social analysis can be embodied with equal success in a fictional novel or an exemplary scholarly study.  The real question, however, is whether the relationships exemplified in this (hypothetical) novel (or study) will be recognizable (that is, “re-cognizable”) in other important instances of interest (ibid, p. 105).  The answer to this question cannot be prejudged philosophically; it is a real test of practical applicability or appropriateness, where theoretical approaches are judged in a pragmatist fashion by the fruit that they bear. 
According to Roth, paying attention to the “projectability of variant modes of categorization” (Roth 2012, p. 326) can provide us with at least one useful way of  thinking about the pertinent norms and dynamics of historical inquiry.  Derived from Goodman’s and Hacking’s work, such an approach concerns itself with the difference between classificatory predicates that keep generating important explanatory insights beyond their original area of application, and those that, although potentially suitable to sketch the disposition of things in a particular instance (or instances), are of no use for organizing our thinking about a wide range of situations of a pertinent kind.  Categories that serve well in a variety of situations tend to become “entrenched” (ibid, p. 328) as standard terms of reference for the practitioners within a field, thereby stabilizing the disciplinary discourse around such pragmatically constituted paradigmatic “objects.”  
Entrenchment is not reality in the ordinary sense: it does not designate the solid self-assuredness of a brick.  What becomes entrenched are ways of seeing and thinking that construe some potentially very elusive objects (be they electrons, force fields, or mood disorders) as being real in a very ordinary sense.  Such attitude is only warranted because, as it turns out, for certain explanatory purposes, treating these terms “realistically” produces a consistent cognitive advantage.  Nowhere is this more evident than in the case of terms which are taken on probation in the light of their putative promise.  The phenomenon is best captured in Laudan’s distinction between “rationality of acceptance” and “rationality of pursuit” (Laudan 1996, p. 111), although a very similar point can be already found in Fleck (1981, p. 25), and its application to history is implied in Mink’s comment that historians often seek hypotheses that are “suggestively rather than deductively fertile” (Mink, 1987, 74).  Some theories and classificatory terms are accepted by researchers because they have strong evidential support and are well entrenched; others, because they suggest a possibility of an eventual retrenchment.
With ordinary assumptions about the reality of disciplinary posits, such exploratory departures from current practice would make little sense.  Novel vocabularies and ways of thinking are usually not introduced in response to encountering the heretofore unseen realities.  When in an entirely novel territory, the already established methodology is frequently our only guide.  Nor do such potentially transitional episodes indicate the crisis of faith in the reality of existing posits.  Scientists attempt to reimagine their field in response to some perceived real problems, and these problems can only be conceptualized as real in the light of a realistic attitude towards the current posits of the established scientific practice.  Objects do not change, thereby generating new problems; instead, problems and priorities evolve generating a demand for new objects.  To put a spin on Ankersmit’s quip that it’s easy “to say true things about the past, but saying the right things about the past is difficult" (Ankersmit 1998, p. 209), one could add that to say the “right” thing is to open an effective path for further inquiry, and that terms which recurrently turn out to be “right” in this sense become eventually entrenched within a research tradition.  What gets entrenched, then, depends, at least in part, on the prevalent dynamics within a research community.  
The view that such disciplinary constraints amount to a mere “transient solidarity” or arbitrary consensus are genuinely bizarre.  It is true that, from a logical-theoretical point of view, research traditions may appear to be relatively amorphous structures that are liable to give rise to conflicting commitments; and so they do.  Research traditions are neither directly explanatory, nor testable (Laudan 1977, pp. 81-82), they provide no more than general guidelines for the development of specific theories (ibid, p. 79; Laudan 1996, p. 83), and the “relative entrenchment” of their central commitments is liable to shift over time (Laudan 1977, p. 100).  This is why a less formal expression like “thought style,” introduced originally by Fleck (1981, p. 39), may almost seem more appropriate.  It is also potentially misleading, however, insofar as it tends to focus attention on reasoning and thought, obscuring the fact that what we are dealing with is a complex form of practice (Hacking 2002, p. 181), the plasticity of which must be seen as an unequivocal gain, rather than a defect.
Practical grounding carries with it a special kind of warrant: the discipline, as well as its theoretical commitments, tends to eventually coalesce around concrete accomplishments, around achievements “in concrete problem-solving” (Roth 1987, p. 128).  This does not eliminate the quandaries of ideological partisanship or the vicissitudes due to personal idiosyncrasies and alliances of interest; nonetheless, just like the force of gravity, it exercises a perpetual attraction which, over time, leaves an indelible imprint on the general bend of things.  Over time, despite the transformation of guiding paradigms, “experimental techniques and styles of reasoning,” “phenomena and reasons accumulate” (Hacking 2002, p. 45).  Significant phenomena in particular prove largely resilient to theory, retaining their definitive importance for the field even when the supporting theory that led to their discovery collapses (ibid, p. 44).  




Approaching philosophy of history, as Roth does, in the light of lessons learned from recent philosophy of science results in a distinctly pragmatist outlook, meaning more pluralist and more experimental, less concerned with principles and foundations and more with the scholarly productivity and results.  It tends to foreground the demand for the extension of inquiry, for the renewal of an active investigation in the light of our recently acquired knowledge, the demand to take a hard look at how things really work without invoking the familiar preconceptions, a desire to open up new inroads of inquiry, to raise new problems.  The contrary trend is exemplified by those who rush to reassure us that questions of this messy sort do not properly belong in philosophy; that there is some “natural” or “rational” rule for individuating people and events, some “natural” or “rational” way to tell the story of their predicaments and to explain their transactions; and that clinging to such sensible philosophical insights, despite empirical complications, affords the only good remedy against the pitfalls of skepticism and relativism.  In philosophy of history, such reassurances are frequently underwritten by a commitment to some more-or-less naïve form of philosophical realism.  
Aside from blinding us to the actual dynamics of historical research, positions of this sort promote a fundamentally distorted understanding of what we mean by the historical past.  The central point of the arguments discussed in this paper boils down to this: it is imperative to distinguish “between the real past of common sense and the historical past of historical research” (Goldstein 1996,  p. 105).  Historical past, unlike the ordinary past, is an historical reconstruction.  Historian’s hypothetical constructs perform the function of organizing some pertinent materials, but these materials are not live episodes torn from the existential fabric of the past.  They are, instead, the presently available materials of historical research: traces, texts, testimonies, material remains.  Historical inquiry is a technique for interrogating the present with a view to constructing a story, or stories, that help us account for our present in terms of the past.
History, then, does not belong in the past; it belongs to our consciousness of the present.  It illuminates certain aspects of who we have become by constructing a picture of the places we have come from, and it builds up this picture with a necessary reference to the disciplinary systems of evidence-gathering, argumentation and proof.  If God had created the world a second ago, and stuffed it with suitable clues, suggesting a number of fabricated stories about our origins, we would have had a history but no past.  If a person’s frame of reference does not extend beyond the temporal limits of his or her individual existence, such a person has a past, but no history.  History is not like memory; it does not relate to the lived experience in the same way.  Memory favors belonging, proximity, continuity; its ideal epistemic stance is derived from the fantasy of an impossible simultaneity with the event, or co-presence.  History operates with the degrees of discontinuity, with the play of distances.  The necessarily retrospective nature of its pronouncements is not perceived by history as a liability, but as an asset. Resulting shifts in perspective provide it with an invaluable methodological advantage: it thrives on missed opportunities, forgone possibilities, coincidental developments, limitations of foresight, and unexpected realizations.  Memory is predominantly sentimental; history, predominantly ironic.
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^1	  The term “pragmatism” does not have one settled meaning.  It usually designates a lose constellation of somewhat divergent views, centered around some shared themes.  Here, it is merely used to signal a continuity between the lines of thought discussed in connection with Roth’s work and some of the key guiding insights of classical pragmatism (Peirce and Dewey, especially) with respect to scientific investigation and intellectual inquiry in general.
^2	  W.H. Walsh, originally responsible for introducing the distinction between the speculative and the critical philosophy of history, primarily had Hegel in his sights, whom he read more or less as a dogmatist philosopher in our sense (Walsh 1955, 120).  Whether or not he was right about Hegel is open to question. The idea that history is governed by reason is said by Hegel to be first demonstrated in philosophy (Hegel 1902, 53), making him a dogmatist.  Yet, Hegel also objects against philosophers introducing “a priori inventions of their own” into history, claiming that his own conclusions are only an “inference” from history as it happened (ibid., 54).
^3	  Clearly, philosophers do not need the sanction of historical practice to point out basic lapses in reasoning and other things of that ilk.
^4	  He does not call himself a pragmatist, and the only pragmatist he cites with approval is Richard Rorty.
^5	  Foucault’s phrase nicely captures the point, although he is only talking about intellectual history.  Italics are mine. 
^6	  Most epistemologists tend to have serious misgivings about the correspondence theory of truth; yet, it is not unusual for other philosophers to accept, at times implicitly and uncritically, some generalized version of this theory as philosophical “common sense.”
